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Abstract
Our intention is to study, in the framework of a very simple optimal growth model, the
consequences on the optimal paths followed by consumption and the environmental quality
of an endogenous discounting. Consumption directly comes from the use of environmental
services and so is a direct cause of environmental degradation. The environment is valued
both as a source of consumption and as an amenity. For a sustainability concern, we intro-
duce an endogenous discount rate growing with the environmental quality, and compare the
optimal growth paths with the ones obtained in the usual case of exogenous and constant
discounting. We show that the convergence of the environmental quality towards a steady
state occurs only for a very special conguration of the parameters in the exogenous dis-
counting case, while it occurs generically in the endogenous discounting one. This happens
for a utility discount rate becoming su¢ ciently high when the environmental quality is high
and su¢ ciently low when the environmental quality is poor. In this case then, endogenous
discounting with a positive marginal discount rate allows us to avoid the depletion of the
environment.
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1 Introduction
Optimal growth models usually make the assumption of a constant and strictly positive utility
social discount rate. This practice has long been questioned, but is still widely used, maybe
because of the lack of a convincing alternative (Heal (2001)).
The rst doubt goes back at least to the well known criticisms by Ramsey and Harrod of
a strictly positive utility social discount rate (Ramsey (1928), Harrod (1948)), and has led to
the so-called undiscounted utilitarianism. But Koopmans (1960) has stressed the drawbacks
of this approach: it usually leads to unrealistically high optimal saving rates for the present
and near-future generations, and so to a sacrice of the present and of the near future instead
of the supposed sacrice of the far future implied by a positive discount rate. Nevertheless,
the temptation of a zero rate of discount is still very present as far as the environment is
concerned because of the very long horizon often involved in environmental matters1 (see, for a
comprehensive view of discounting and the environment, the contributions collected in the book
edited by Portney and Weyant (1999)).
The usual approach has been challenged by authors arguing that the utility discount rate
should be neither constant and positive nor zero, but should be decreasing in the course of
time. They claim that empirical evidence supports that decrease. Harvey (1994), Heal (1998),
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Laibson, (1996), (1997) or Barro (1999) propose formulas of
decreasing discounting justied by considerations of individual psychology. But the choice of a
utility discount rate in normative models is an ethical one, as stressed by Heal (1998), (2001)
or Ayong Le Kama (2001), and it is less than obvious that a social planner should only reect
in this choice the representative consumers psychology. Gollier (2002a), (2002b) and Weitzman
(1998) justify decreasing discounting in a partial equilibrium set-up by the uncertainty on the
future growth rate of the economy or on the future interest rate. Li and Löfgren (2000) study
an economy with heterogeneous agents di¤ering by their utility discount rate (constant and
exogenous) but identical in all other respects. They show that this economy behaves as if
there was a unique representative agent with a decreasing discount rate, tending in the long
run towards the rate of the more patient agent. Here the decreasing discount rate is not an
assumption but a consequence of the heterogeneity.
Another strand of literature, disconnected from environmental concerns, studies the question
of habit formation, and introduces a utility discount factor depending on present and past
consumption levels (Epstein (1987), Becker, Boyd and Sung (1989), Obstfeld (1990), Das (2003)).
Obstfeld (1990) gives a formal treatment of the simple optimal growth model with this utility
discount factor, and concludes that most of the time this assumption does not qualitatively
change the optimal growth paths, in comparison with the case of an exogenous constant discount
rate.
We want here to extend Obstfelds approach to a growth model in which environment matters
(Pittel (2002) has the same objective in a di¤erent framework). We consider two ways by which
the environmental quality could a¤ect the social intertemporal welfare: the usual direct e¤ect of
the current level of environmental quality on instantaneous utility (amenity e¤ect), and a less
usual indirect e¤ect of current and past levels of environmental quality on the utility discount
factor. This discount factor now depends on the path of environmental quality through time.
Utility is no longer time-separable, tastes are intertemporally dependent. The discount rate
depends on the current state of the environment. Besides, we make the assumption of a positive
marginal impatience: the discount rate increases with the level of the environmental quality.
It is possible to rationalize this ethical choice of an endogenous utility discount rate depending
on the environmental quality and increasing with it by a sustainable development motive. Society
could express in this way a form of intergenerational altruism, consisting in deciding to discount
1Obviously, the time horizon is especially long for problems such as global warming or nuclear waste disposal.
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the future at a rate all the lower since the environmental quality is low. That could be a way of
introducing sustainability concerns in optimal growth models2.
We then try to elucidate the consequences of such an ethical choice. These consequences
are very hard to assess in complex growth models with capital accumulation. We thus use here
a simple framework where consumption directly comes from the use of environmental services,
and so directly causes environmental degradation3.
We rst study the evolution of the economy and the environment with an exogenous and con-
stant discount rate (section 2), as a benchmark for the study of the endogenous utility discount
case. We present and discuss in section 3 the assumptions made about the endogenous discount
factor and their consequences, and then characterize all the types of optimal paths that the
economy can follow under these assumptions. We show that the convergence of the environmen-
tal quality towards a steady state occurs only for a very special conguration of the parameters
in the exogenous discounting case, while it occurs generically in the endogenous discounting
one. This happens for a utility discount rate becoming su¢ ciently high when the environmental
quality is high and su¢ ciently low when the environmental quality is poor. Section 4 concludes.
2 The economy with a constant discount rate
2.1 The model
We introduce an optimal growth model with an environmental asset. This asset can be seen as
natural capital or as the environmental quality. It is valued both as a source of consumption
of environmental services and as a stock of amenities. The stock of environmental asset S
is depleted by consumption C, but regenerates itself at a rate m > 0 taken as constant for
simplication. Its dynamics is then described by
:
St = mSt   Ct: (1)
The objective of the social planner is to maximize the present value of the life-time utility
of the representative consumer over an innite horizon. The representative consumer derives
felicity4 u(:) not only from consumption, but also from environmental quality. The future
felicities are discounted at the constant rate  > 0. Let C = [Ct]
1
0 and S = [St]
1
0 represent
some consumption and environmental quality paths respectively. The social planner seeks to
maximize
maxU (C;S) =
Z +1
0
e tu (Ct; St) dt; (2)
subject to 8<:
_St = mSt   Ct;
Ct  0; St  0;
S0 given.
(3)
2 It could be interesting to study the market economy, where private agents, unaware of sustainability concerns
and/or considering the environmental quality as an externaliy, would discount exponentially, and to look at the
way the optimal solutions with endogenous discounting could be implemented.
3 It is in some sense the worst possible case: there exist neither technical progress enhancing the transformation
of environmental services into consumption, nor substitution possibilities between environmental services and man-
made capital. There is no means of improving the environmental quality except by natural regeneration. In such
a framework, consumption and environmental quality necessarily evolve together in the long run: both increase,
or both decrease, or both converge towards a stationary state.
4We follow the convention of Arrow and Kurz (1970) in referring to the subutility functions as felicities. In
contrast, the term utility always refers to the planners intertemporal objective.
3
Assumption 1. The felicity function u (:) is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, and possesses the
following properties5: 8C;S > 0; uC > 0; uS > 0; uCC  0: It is also concave with respect
to its two arguments: uCCuSS   (uCS)2  0:
The constant-value Hamiltonian of the previous problem is
H = u (C;S) e t + e [mS   C] ;
where e  0 is the co-state variable associated with the environmental quality. The rst order
necessary conditions then give us
 = uC ; (4a)
:


=  m   (C;S) C
S
; (4b)
where  = eet, and the transversality condition writes
lim
t!1 e
 ttSt = 0: (3c)
 (C;S)  SuSCuC > 0 by assumption 1 is the ratio of the values of environmental quality and
consumption, both evaluated at their marginal felicity.  (:) then reects the relative preference
for the environmentof the representative agent.
Di¤erentiation of equation (4a) with respect to time leads to the following result:
:

 =
1
:
C
C + 2
:
S
S ; where 1 = CuCC/uC < 0 is the elasticity of the marginal felicity of consumption
with respect to the level of consumption and 2 = SuCS/uC S 0 is the elasticity of the marginal
felicity with respect to the level of environmental quality. Substituting this relationship into (4b)
yields
1
:
C
C
+ 2
:
S
S
=  m   (C;S) C
S
: (5)
2.2 The balanced growth path (BGP)
2.2.1 Existence of a BGP
Given the equation of motion of the environmental quality (1), if the growth rate of the en-
vironmental quality is constant along the optimal path then the ratio C=S is also constant,
which indicates that C and S grow at the same rate. Let g be this common rate. We have
C=S = m  g: Substituting g into (5) leads to
g =
  (1 +  (C;S))m
1 + 2   (C;S)
:
Therefore, the feasibility of the BGP, that is the constancy of g; requires:
Assumption 2. (i) The elasticities of the marginal felicity of consumption with respect to con-
sumption, 1; and environmental quality, 2; are constant; (ii) the relative preference for
the environment is constant, i.e.  (C;S) = ; 8 (C;S)6.
5uC and uS are the rst partial derivatives of the function u (:) with respect to its arguments C and S: uCC
is likewise the second partial derivative, using obvious notation.
6Smulders and Gradus (1996) show that (ii) is a necessary condition for the existence of a balanced growth
path when the stock of environmental resource is a source of felicity.
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These restrictions7 give rise to a non-separable felicity function of the CRRA-type:
u (C;S) =
 
CS
1 1=
1  1= ; (6)
where  =  1=1 > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
Assumption 3.  < 1:
This assumption is su¢ cient to ensure the concavity of the felicity function8. It implies that
the marginal felicity of consumption decreases with the level of environmental quality: uCS < 0:
Furthermore, with  < 1 the felicity function (6) is negative and thus bounded from above.
It is easy to show that, with the specication of the felicity function (6), the growth rate
along the BGP is
g = 

m  
1 + 

; (7)
which may be positive or negative, depending on the parameters9. We can also notice that
the optimal growth rate is bounded from above: g  m = lim!0 g: m therefore reects the
highest growth rate that society can expect; it depends on the regenerative capacities of the
environment.
Besides, as S is evolving along the BGP at the rate g and  at the rate  m  (m  g);
the transversality condition (3c) is fullled if and only if (g  m)(1 + ) < 0 i.e. g < m: Given
that we have assumed  < 1, the upper bound of g is strictly lower than m: g  m < m: The
transversality condition is always satised.
2.2.2 Properties of the BGP
Introducing the stationary variable x = CS ; we easily show, using the equation of motion of
the environmental quality (1) and equation (5), that the dynamic system characterizing the
evolution of the economy and the environment reduces to a single equation in x;
_x
x
= (1 + )(x  ex); (8)
where ex > 0 is the stationary ratio of consumption to environmental quality along the BGP. By
(1) and (7), we have: ex = m  g = (1  )m+ 
1 + 
: (9)
Equation (8) is unstable. If the x ratio is higher than ex; the environmental quality will be
consumed completely, and if on the contrary it is lower, the environmental quality will grow
without bounds and consumption will be driven to zero. The x ratio then takes from the initial
time its stationary value ex; and initial consumption is C0 = exS0 = (1  )m+ 1+S0:
7Despite the lack of generality that these restrictions imply, they allow us to study the e¤ect of endogenous
discounting in a framework where the benchmark the case with constant and exogenous discounting consists
in a balanced growth path.
8We see easily that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for concavity is   1+

:  < 1 is then su¢ cient,
and we restrict ourselves to this case for technical reasons (see below).
9The growth rate of consumption and environmental quality along the BGP will be positive if the natural
regeneration and the preference for the environment are su¢ ciently high, and if the discount rate is low enough.
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3 The economy with an endogenous discount rate
3.1 The model
We now introduce an economy where the social planner uses a discount factor based on the
historical path of the environmental quality. In all other respects, the economy is the same as
in the previous section. The intertemporal discounted utility function, with variable discount
rate, of a representative consumer is now given by
U (C;S) =
Z +1
0
e tu (Ct; St) dt; (10)
where the felicity function u (:) satises assumptions 1, 2 and 3. The future felicities are dis-
counted at time t with a discount factor equal to e t ; where t  0 is assumed to depend on
the past and current levels of the environmental quality, as described by the following equation:
t =
Z t
0
(S )d : (11)
(St) =  d ln(e
 t )
dt  0; 8St; is the utility discount rate at time t10.
In the case of an endogenous discounting depending on the past and current levels of con-
sumption, there is considerable disagreement over whether the marginal discount rate should
be positive or negative (see Obstfeld (1990)). Loosely speaking, a positive marginal rate means
that rich people are more impatient than poor ones. This assumption is frequently made in
the literature related to the question of habit formation, but never satisfactorily justied (see
Epstein (1987)). Obstfeld (1990) justies his adoption of this assumption by the fact that it is
necessary for the convergence of his model. Das (2003) shows that this is not a general property
of models with habit formation, which can, under some additional assumptions, be stable even
with a negative marginal discount rate. Whatever the psychological explanations that underline
each approach, our view is that the nal choice is normative. Moreover, we think that the
fact that impatience should be increasing or decreasing with the consumption of private goods
doesnt imply anything about how impatience should evolve with the public natural capital11.
We require:
Assumption 4. 
0
(S) > 0 and 
00
(S) < 0; 8S > 0:
Our choice of a discount rate increasing with the environmental quality is justied by the
outcomes of the current debate about discounting and the environment (see Portney and Weyant
(1999) for a comprehensive view of this debate). The main point is to nd how to properly take
into account the welfare of the far future generations, that the traditional exogenous exponen-
tial discounting makes quite irrelevant, without sacricing the welfare of the present ones; or,
as has been stressed by Chichilnisky (1996), how to avoid any dictatorship of the present and of
the future. One possible way is to use hyperbolic (decreasing) discounting, but it leads to time
inconsistent choices. Our approach allows us to avoid this. In this context, the positive marginal
10The preference structure, as specied in (10), is recursive in the sense that  is allowed to depend on the
past and current levels of the environmental quality, as described by equation (11). Thus, a change in the present
level of environmental quality will not only have an e¤ect on the current level of felicity, but also on the entire
future felicity stream.
11This is the reason why our model does not reduce to the familiar AK framework of the endogenous growth
theory, even if it seems formally identical: the AK model deals with man-made capital, which is a private good,
while we want to study endogenous discounting depending on the natural capital, which is a public or at least a
merit good.
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discount rate reects the sustainability motive that here underlies endogenous discounting: con-
cerned by intergenerational equity, the society chooses to discount at a rate all the smaller since
the environmental quality is low, because in this case environmental questions become pressing.
The idea is that an endogenous discounting with a positive marginal discount rate depending on
the level of the environmental quality should help to prevent or to limit further deteriorations
of the environment.
Following Obstfeld (1990), we consider t as a second state variable that accounts for accu-
mulated impatience12: Di¤erentiating (11) with respect to time yields
_t = (St): (12)
The social planners program is therefore to maximize (10) subjects to (1) and (12) together
with the initial conditions (S0 and 0 given) and non-negativity constraints (Ct  0; St  0).
The constant-value Hamiltonian of the social planners problem is
H

C;S;; e; e = u (C;S) e  + e [mS   C]  e(S); (13)
where e  0 is the co-state variable associated with environmental quality, and e is the co-state
variable associated with the stock of accumulated impatience(Obstfeld (1990)).
Applying Pontryagins maximum principle, we get the following rst-order necessary condi-
tions for optimality:
uC = ; (14a)
:


= (S) m  C
S
+


0(S); (14b)
:


= (S)  u(C;S)

; (14c)
where  = ee and  = ee (thus _ (S) = :ee), together with the transversality condition13
lim
t!1H (t) = 0: (15)
Note that, as Obstfeld (1990) points out, when  converges to a denite long term value, as
will be the case below, the third equation (14c) of this system can be integrated into
t =
Z 1
t
u(Cs; Ss)e
  R st (S )dds = et
Z 1
t
e su(Cs; Ss)ds; (16)
which means that t corresponds to the discounted present value of the future ow of felicities
from the standpoint of time t. Given that we have assumed a negative felicity function, we also
have t  0:
We prove in the Appendix that assumptions 3 and 4 ensure the strict concavity of the
maximized Hamiltonian H

S;; e; e = maxC HC;S;; e; e with respect to S and . So
the necessary conditions are also su¢ cient for an optimum (Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987)).
We now reduce the system (14a)-(14c) into a more tractable one. Following Palivos, Wang
and Zhang (1997), recall that, along the optimal path, dH/ dt = @H/ @t: Since the social plan-
ners program considered here is autonomous, @H/ @t = 0; thus the Hamiltonian is independent
12Due to the non constant discount rate, Pontryagins maximum principle cannot be applied directly. We need
this state variable to solve the problem within the standard optimal control approach.
13On the transversality conditions in innite horizon problems see Michel (1982).
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of time along the optimal path. This and the transversality condition (15) imply that H (t) = 0
8t along the optimal path. We can therefore deduce
 =
1
(S)
[u (C;S) +  (mS   C)] : (17)
The system (14a)-(14b) then writes
 = uC ; (18a)
_

= (S) m  C
S
+
0(S)
(S)
u (C;S)  (C  mS)uC
uC
: (18b)
3.2 The optimal paths
Given assumptions 1 and 2, the di¤erentiation of the rst-order condition (18a) with respect to
time yields
_

=   1

:
C
C
+ (1  1

)
_S
S
:
Substituting the dynamics of the environmental quality (1) and the rst-order condition
(18b) into this equation, we show that the dynamics of consumption along the optimal path is
:
C
C
= 
C
S
  (S) + (   (1  ))m+ "(S)

1
1  
C
S
 m

; (19)
where "(S) = S
0(S)
(S) is the elasticity of the utility discount rate  (:) with respect to the environ-
mental quality. "(S) is positive under assumption 4. If we reintroduce the variable x = C=S;
the dynamic system characterizing the evolution of this economy is given by the motion of the
ratio of consumption to environmental quality along the optimal path:
:
x
x
=

1 + +

1  "(S)

[x  (1  )m]  (S); (20)
together with the one of the environmental quality (1).
Let us assume that the utility discount rate is bounded:
Assumption 5. (i) limS!1 (S) =  is nite, and (ii) limS!0 (S) =   0:
The rst part of this assumption seems reasonable: it means that when the environmental
quality becomes very high the discount rate remains bounded.  can be interpreted as the
utility discount rate that the social planner would choose if economic activity did not harm
environmental quality, which could remain always high. The second part of this assumption just
introduces the notation used for the lower bound of the utility discount rate, eventually equal
to zero14.
Now we can study all the types of optimal scenarios that can occur with endogenous dis-
counting, given the parameters of the economy.
14An example of discount rate statisfying assumptions 4 and 5, with  = 0; is:
(S) = 

1  e S

;  > 0:
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3.2.1 The stationary state
Let us rst look at the existence of a stationary state of the dynamic system (1) and (20).
A stationary solution (x; S) of this dynamic system is characterized by :x =
:
S = 0: Thus,
equation (1) implies x = m: Substituting this into (20), we easily see that stationary solutions
are values S satisfying the following equation:
(S) = m

1 + +

1  "(S)

: (21)
Assumption 6. "0(S)  0; 8S:
This assumption demands that the elasticity of the utility discount rate is decreasing in S.
It seems reasonable, and besides it is necessary to ensure the stability of the stationary solution
(see below).
Proposition 1 : Under assumptions 1-6, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium (x; S)
characterized by (
x = m;
(S) = m
h
1 + + 1 "(S
)
i
;
(22)
if and only if   m(1 + ) and   m
h
1 + + 1 "(0)
i
i.e. if and only if the upper bound of
the utility discount rate is high enough vis-à-vis the relative preference for the environment and
the natural regeneration rate and the lower bound low enough15:
Proof. Let us consider the function f (S) = m
h
1 + + 1 "(S)
i
> 0 which corresponds to the
RHS of (21). A solution S of (21) will be such that (S) = f (S) : We know, by assumptions
4 and 5, that (S) is strictly increasing from its lower bound  (eventually equal to zero) to its
upper bound : Besides, f(S) is positive, and we have f
0
(S) = m 1 "
0(S)  0 under assumption
6 above. Palivos et al. (1997) show (Lemma 1 p. 212) that under assumption 5 (i) we have
limS!1 S0(S) = 0; i.e. limS!1 "(S) = 0: Then f (S) decreases monotically for S = 0 to +1
from f(0) = m
h
1 + + 1 "(0)
i
to m(1 + ). There exists therefore a unique value S such
that (S) = f (S) if and only if

; 
 \ [m(1 + ); f(0)] 6= ?; which reduces to   m(1 + )
and   f(0):
Proposition 2 : Under assumptions 1-6, the unique stationary equilibrium (x; S) is a saddle-
point.
Proof. We can show that the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (1) and (20) is
J =
 
0  S
m


1 m"
0(S)  0(S)

(S)
!
:
We then have trJ = (S) > 0 and
det J = mS


1  m"
0(S)  0(S)

< 0
because "0(S)  0 by assumption 6 and 0(S) > 0 by assumption 4.
15 If  = 0; the second part of this condition is always fullled.
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Propositions 1 and 2 state that endogenous discounting associated with a high upper bound
of the utility discount rate and a small lower bound of this rate leads to the convergence of
the economy towards a locally stable stationary state. In the exogenous discounting case there
is a unique conguration of the parameters ensuring g = 0: the discount rate must satisfy
 = (1+)m; whereas the existence of a stationary state is generic in the endogenous discounting
case. Besides, the steady state is unstable in the exogenous case, whereas it is saddle-path stable
in the endogenous one. This result means that endogenous discounting with a utility discount
rate becoming su¢ ciently high when the environmental quality is high and su¢ ciently low when
the environment is very depleted allows society to stabilize the environmental quality, which
would either collapse or grow innitely with exogenous discounting. See gure 1, where the
_x = 0 curve is growing, and admits x = (1  )m+ 1+ as an asymptote16.
-
6 6
?

-
?
-6
*
1

9
9
S
x
m
x
S
_S = 0
_x = 0
x
Figure 1: The convergence towards a stationary state. Case  > m(1 + ) i.e. x > m and
  f(0) i.e. x  m
More technically, this result shows that the endogenous discounting allows a stabilization of
the environmental quality when the bounds of the discount function are such that the range of
feasible values of the ratio of consumption to environmental quality includes the regenerative
capacity of the environment, m: That is: for (S) 2 ;  ; S 2 [0;+1[ ; a necessary condition
for the existence of a stationary solution is m 2 [x; x[ :
Let us now characterize the optimal paths when no stationary solution exists.
3.2.2 The asymptotically balanced growth path
Adapting Palivos et al. (1997), we say that a solution of the system (1) and (20) is an asymp-
totically balanced growth path if limt!1
_S
S exists and is nite (the path is nondegenerate if this
limit is strictly positive) and if limt!1 _xx = 0. Palivos et al. (1997) show that necessary condi-
tions for the existence of an asymptotically balanced growth solution of this type of problem is
an asymptotically constant discount rate and an asymptotically constant elasticity of marginal
felicity. These two conditions are by assumption fullled here. We then obtain the following.
Proposition 3 : Under assumptions 1-6, there exists a unique nondegenerate asymptotically
16We show easily that the locus _x = 0 is a curve x(S) increasing in S from x(0) = x = (1 )m+ 
1++ 
1  "(0)
to
limS!1 x(S) = (1 )m+ 1++ 
1  limS!1 "(S)
: It will be shown below that limS!1 "(S) = 0: So limS!1 x(S) =
(1  )m+ 
1+
= x: Besides, it is straightforward to show that the locus _x = 0 is concave.
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balanced growth path characterized by8<: g = 

m  1+

;
x = (1  )m+ 1+ ;
(23)
if and only if  < m(1+) i.e. the upper bound of the utility discount rate is low enough vis-à-vis
the relative preference for the environment and the natural regeneration rate. If  = m(1 + );
we have a degenerate asymptotically balanced growth path with g = 0:
Proof. Let us suppose that there exists a constant and strictly positive growth rate g such that
limt!1
_S
S = limt!1
_C
C = g: We then have limt!1
_x
x = 0: Because g > 0, we have limt!1 S =
+1 and assumption 5 (i) can be used. As shown by Palivos et al. (1997) (Lemma 1 p. 212),
we then have limS!1 "(S) = 0: The long term of the system (1) and (20) is then given by
g = m  x;
0 = (1 + )(x  (1  )m)  ;
from which we deduce (23). By construction, this solution is valid if and only if g > 0; i.e.
 < m(1 + ). The case  = m(1 + ) is straightforward.
We may notice that the asymptotic growth rate g is exactly the same as the balanced growth
rate g of the problem with exogenous discounting, provided that  =  (see equation (7)). Then
if the upper bound of the utility discount rate is exactly the rate that would be chosen by
the social planner in the case of exogenous discounting, the endogenous discounting economy
follows in the long run the same path as the exogenous one, provided that this rate is low enough.
The system (1) and (20) is a dynamic system involving two variables: the environmental
quality S; which grows asymptotically at a constant rate, and the ratio of consumption to
environmental quality x which is stationary in the long run. Moreover, equation (20) makes the
growth rate of x depend on the level of S; and so S cannot be easily eliminated to obtain a
system involving two variables stationary in the long run. Nevertheless, we obtain the following
results.
Proposition 4 : Under assumption 1-6, if the upper bound of the utility discount rate is low
enough (i.e. if   m(1 + )), then along the asymptotically balanced growth path:
(i) x is lower than its long run value, i.e. xt < x 8t;
(ii) the growth rate of the environmental quality is higher than its long run value, i.e. _St=St > g
8t:
Proof. It is easy to show that equation (20) can be rewritten as:
:
x
x
=

1 + +

1  "(S)

(x  x) +      (S)+ 2"(S)
(1  ) (1 + ) :
This equation shows that for any given value of x such that x  x; _x=x > 0 and x diverges, which
is impossible. We therefore deduce that x < x 8t (this shows the rst part of the proposition).
We then have _S=S = m  x = g + x  x > g.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that endogenous discounting associated with an upper bound
of the utility discount rate relatively low leads to an asymptotically balanced growth path, and
that in the short run the environmental quality grows faster than in the long run at the expense
of lower consumption. Society is less impatient to consume in the short run than in the long
run, as long as the environmental quality is not high enough. See gure 2.
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Figure 2: The asymptotically balanced growth path. Case   m(1 + ) i.e. x  m
3.2.3 The asymptotical depletion of the environmental quality
We now consider the last feasible case. This case involves a high lower bound of the utility
discount rate, such that  > f(0):
Proposition 5 : Under assumptions 16, if  > m

1 + + 1 "(0)

(i.e. if the lower bound
of the utility discount rate is high enough vis-à-vis the preference for the environment and the
natural regeneration rate), an asymptotical depletion of the environmental quality occurs, with8<: g = 

m  1++ 
1  "(0)

< 0;
x = (1  )m+ 1++ 
1  "(0)
:
(24)
Proof. When the environmental quality decreases towards 0, the long term of the system (1)
and (20) is given by 
g = m  x;
0 = (1 + + 1 "(0))(x  (1  )m)  ;
from which we deduce (24). By construction, this solution is valid if and only if g < 0; i.e.
 > m

1 + + 1 "(0)

= f(0).
Proposition 6 : Under assumptions 16, if  > m

1 + + 1 "(0)

, then along the path of
asymptotical depletion of the environmental quality:
(i) x is higher than its long run value, i.e. xt > x 8t;
(ii) the environmental quality decreases more quickly than in the long run, i.e. _St=St < g 8t:
Proof. It is easy to show that equation (20) can be rewritten as
:
x
x
=

1 + +

1  "(S)

(x  x) +  (   (S)) + 
2 ("(S)  "(0))
(1  )

1 + + 1 "(0)
 :
This equation shows that if x  x; _x=x < 0 and x converges towards zero, which is impossible
given the properties of the felicity function. We therefore deduce that x > x; 8t (this shows the
rst part of the proposition). We then have _S=S = m  x = g + x  x < g.
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Propositions 5 and 6 indicate that when the discount rate is bounded from below at a high
value, the optimal solution is an asymptotical depletion of the environmental quality, because
the societys impatience remains high whatever the level of the natural capital. Furthermore,
impatience is higher in the short run than in the long run, because the environmental quality is
higher and impatience increases with it. This implies that in the short run environmental quality
decreases faster, which allows the society to consume more. See gure 3. In this case, the ratio
of consumption to environmental quality is always higher than the regenerative capacity of the
environment m:
-
6 6
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
?
?
-
9
9
S
x
m
x
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Figure 3: The asymptotical depletion of the environmental quality. Case  > f(0) i.e. x > m
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced an endogenous utility discount rate depending on the state of the
environmental quality. Even if there is a disagreement over whether the marginal discount rate
should be positive or negative, in the context of the habit formation literature where the discount
rate depends on consumption for a private motive, we make here the assumption of a positive
marginal discount rate depending on the state of the environment to reect the social motive of
sustainability. In the context of the long-lasting debate about discounting and the environment,
this expresses the fact that if the society is concerned by intergenerational equity, it will choose
to discount at a rate all the smaller since the environmental quality is low.
We show within this framework that under both exogenous and endogenous discounting
three qualitatively di¤erent scenarios can occur: growth of consumption and the environmental
quality to innity, decrease to zero, and convergence towards a positive steady state (see gure
4). This last scenario occurs with endogenous discounting when the discount rate is allowed to
vary between bounds  and ; with  large enough and  small enough, while in the exogenous
case it occurs only for a discount rate exactly equal to (1 + )m; a razor-edge case. So a
stabilization of the environmental quality is more likely to occur with endogenous discounting.
This methodology can be used in applied cost-benet analysis. While implying a utility
discount rate decreasing in the course of time if environmental conditions worsen, it avoids the
problem of time inconsistency and gives a new justication to this decrease.
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Appendix: proof of the strict concavity of the maximized Hamil-
tonian with respect to S and 
The constant value Hamiltonian is given by equation (13) and the rst order condition for
optimality with respect to C is given by equation (14a) and writes uC = ee: With our speci-
cation of the felicity function (6), this equation gives us the following expression for the optimal
consumption:
C

S;; e =  e S(1  1 )e
!
:
We have H

S;; e; e = maxC HC;S;; e; e = HC; S;; e; e :
H

S;; e; e = u (C; S) e  + e [mS   C]  e(S)
= emS   e(S)  1
1  e
 

Se
 1
:
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So
HS = em  e0(S) + e S( 1) 1e 1
H =

1  e
 

Se
 1
;
and
HSS =  e00(S) +  ((   1)  1) e S( 1) 2e 1
H =  
2
1  e
 

Se
 1
HS =  e 
S( 1) 1e 1 ;
from which we easily deduce:
HSSH   (HS)2 =
2
1  e
 2S2( 1) 2e2( 1) + 
2
1  e
 S( 1)e 1 e00(S):
Given that by equation (16) we have e = e   0; assumptions 3 and 4 ensure that HSSH 
(HS)2 > 0:
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